What is so pathetically controversial is, one day LION AIR claims to have ZERO KNOWLEDGE that the MCAS even existed…even though they later claim that, the previous flight had serious issues WITH the same systems they claim to have no knowledge of. Yet, LION AIR changes out an AOA sensor and sends a crowd of people to their death.
I’m a retired tech of 40 years, 32 of those years with a single airline. Other presented reporting in the articles as such REALLY has me SMH due to not only the pathetic inaccuracy but also, misstating facts that have already have been proven to be THE CAUSE of a crash or incident. (Such as the Asiana Airlines Boeing 777-200ER that struck a seawall in San Francisco in 2013..which was a pure under-trained flight crew misgiving, NOT a fault of automation!
When you rely on training in order to compensate for a system design flaws or failures it is not a training issue. Rather it IS a design flaw. There are a number of design mitigations that can eliminate or minimize the need for operator interaction. Multiple sensors that vote is one strategy. Having two sensors such that if they disagree, the system is disengaged with a clear warning flag presented n the primary flight display.
As a System Safety engineer for over 35 years I am continually aggravated whenever the pilot, operator, or soldier is blamed when they fail to overcome design, and processing deficiencies. All too often procedures are put into place for mitigating high consequence hazards rather than the more effective but more expensive design improvements driven by thorough system hazard analyses.
This is clearly an automation flaw system not a pilot error.
The pilots job simply does not include lengthy trouble-shooting of a sensor error in an aeroplane that has thousands of them dotted around. Pilots are not engineers. They simply do not have the time in the air to investigate in a few minutes what would take experienced engineers hours on the ground to fully elucidate that to do/not do, as well as fly the aeroplane.
Boeing has to do the honourable of owning to the problem. Perhaps they could suggest having an engineer seated in the cockpit on board all the time (not a very good ad for the new, too sophisticated jet).
Too much of anything is unhealthy. That goes for too much automation, in an attempt to design the pilot out of the cockpit.
What is so pathetically controversial is, one day LION AIR claims to have ZERO KNOWLEDGE that the MCAS even existed…even though they later claim that, the previous flight had serious issues WITH the same systems they claim to have no knowledge of. Yet, LION AIR changes out an AOA sensor and sends a crowd of people to their death.
I’m a retired tech of 40 years, 32 of those years with a single airline. Other presented reporting in the articles as such REALLY has me SMH due to not only the pathetic inaccuracy but also, misstating facts that have already have been proven to be THE CAUSE of a crash or incident. (Such as the Asiana Airlines Boeing 777-200ER that struck a seawall in San Francisco in 2013..which was a pure under-trained flight crew misgiving, NOT a fault of automation!
When you rely on training in order to compensate for a system design flaws or failures it is not a training issue. Rather it IS a design flaw. There are a number of design mitigations that can eliminate or minimize the need for operator interaction. Multiple sensors that vote is one strategy. Having two sensors such that if they disagree, the system is disengaged with a clear warning flag presented n the primary flight display.
As a System Safety engineer for over 35 years I am continually aggravated whenever the pilot, operator, or soldier is blamed when they fail to overcome design, and processing deficiencies. All too often procedures are put into place for mitigating high consequence hazards rather than the more effective but more expensive design improvements driven by thorough system hazard analyses.
This is clearly an automation flaw system not a pilot error.
The pilots job simply does not include lengthy trouble-shooting of a sensor error in an aeroplane that has thousands of them dotted around. Pilots are not engineers. They simply do not have the time in the air to investigate in a few minutes what would take experienced engineers hours on the ground to fully elucidate that to do/not do, as well as fly the aeroplane.
Boeing has to do the honourable of owning to the problem. Perhaps they could suggest having an engineer seated in the cockpit on board all the time (not a very good ad for the new, too sophisticated jet).
Too much of anything is unhealthy. That goes for too much automation, in an attempt to design the pilot out of the cockpit.