Ohio Supreme Court: Township not Liable for Officer’s Out-of-Jurisdiction Crash

September 20, 2011

The Supreme Court of Ohio has ruled that a political subdivision is immune from liability if one of its police officers is involved in a traffic accident when responding to an emergency even if it is located out the officer’s jurisdiction.

The Ohio Supreme Court Office of Public Information reports that in a 6-1 decision authored by Justice Robert R. Cupp, the Court affirmed a ruling by the 10th District Court of Appeals that a Franklin County township was immune from possible liability when one of its officers was involved in a traffic accident outside of the township’s boundaries while the officer was responding to a general call for assistance from a county sheriff’s deputy.

The Court held that the immunity provided to political subdivisions for emergency calls under state statutes applied despite the lack of a formal mutual aid agreement between the township and the county.

Sergeant Travis Carpenter of the Clinton Township police department overheard a radio call from a Franklin County sheriff’s deputy asking for assistance in pursuing a driver who had fled on foot after being pulled over by the deputy for a traffic offense. Although the deputy’s radio call had identified his location as outside of Clinton Township, Carpenter responded to the call. In the course of doing so, and while he was outside the boundaries of the township, Carpenter’s police cruiser collided with a car in which the driver, Vashawn McBride, and Lea Smith, a passenger, were injured.

Smith filed a civil suit in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas seeking recovery from the township for her injuries. The township moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was immune from liability under Ohio’s sovereign immunity statute because the accident that caused Smith’s injuries had occurred while Carpenter was responding to a call for assistance in his capacity as a police officer.

The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the township. Smith appealed that ruling. On review, the 10th District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s holding that the township and Carpenter were both entitled to summary judgment.

Smith sought and was granted Supreme Court review of the 10th District’s decision.

Justice Cupp, writing the majority opinion of the Court, said Smith asserted in her appeal that Clinton Township was not entitled to immunity as there was no mutual-aid agreement between Clinton Township and Franklin County. Smith argued that ‘Carpenter did not have a professional obligation to respond to the dispatch that ultimately caused him to be at the intersection outside of his jurisdiction where the accident occurred and thus, summary judgment was improper.’

Smith also argued that because there was no mutual-aid agreement between the public entities, ‘Carpenter had no authority to exercise arrest powers’ and therefore ‘had no authority or duty to respond to the dispatch for help outside his jurisdiction.’

The Court, however, agreed ‘with Clinton Township that a police officer’s authority to make an arrest is different from a police officer’s professional obligation to respond to a request for assistance and that a responding officer may provide assistance to another law-enforcement officer absent the authority to arrest,’ Cupp wrote.

Carpenter was responding to an emergency call, Cupp observed, and state ‘statutes by their clear terms grant immunity to a political subdivision when an officer is responding to a call to duty, which includes responding to a dispatch for assistance out of a professional obligation to do so.’

Justice Cupp’s opinion was joined by Chief Justice Maureen O’Connor and Justices Evelyn Lundberg Stratton, Terrence O’Donnell, Judith Ann Lanzinger and Yvette McGee Brown.

Justice Paul E. Pfeifer entered a dissent in which he noted that the statutory scheme established by the legislature provides that political subdivisions generally are liable for traffic accident damages caused by on-duty police officers during the performance of non-emergency assignments such as routine patrol duty and transportation of prisoners.

He wrote: ‘The General Assembly has carved out only limited circumstances — emergencies — when political subdivisions enjoy sovereign immunity when their police officers drive negligently. … I would hold that Officer Carpenter’s well-intentioned foray outside his jurisdiction is included in that broad category of police work that is not contained within the narrow exception to liability. The term ’emergency’ cannot be used to describe a situation in which a police officer has no actual duty to respond, has no authority to make an arrest, and does not demonstrate to other drivers that he is responding to an emergency, i.e. does not use lights and sirens.’

The case is 2010-0809. Smith v. McBride, Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-4674. Franklin App. No. 09AP-571, 2010-Ohio-1222.

Source: Ohio Supreme Court

Topics Ohio Law Enforcement

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