Does anyone else with a mathematical background think $$ caps are misguided way to attempt to control loss costs? Although they get a lot of publicity, I don’t think so called “pain and suffering” awards add very much to loss costs, cap or no cap. I think it’s one of those things that politicians and voters cling to because they understand, but it’s just a distraction in the argument to me. Tort reform should focus on separating legitimate claims from outrageous claims early in the process, so defendents are less likely to settle just to make a claim go away.
You have a legitimate point in that we don’t often see the apportionment between economic and non-economic damages. (See Texas for a closed claim database on this.) But also don’t miss the indirect influences of unlimited non-economics; one large jury award increases the starting point demand and can also increase the frequency of future claims in the hopes of the “jackpot” payout. Limits can help squelch the frequency growth and quell severity inflation.
Medical review boards do seem to be a reasonable way to screen valid claims.
My concern about review boards is that they are bureaucratic in nature and may potentially be political (like some of the Industrial Accident “judges” that I have seen). I would like to see plaintifs and their attorneys have some skin in the game, being forced to pay at least some of the defense costs if they lose.
Does anyone else with a mathematical background think $$ caps are misguided way to attempt to control loss costs? Although they get a lot of publicity, I don’t think so called “pain and suffering” awards add very much to loss costs, cap or no cap. I think it’s one of those things that politicians and voters cling to because they understand, but it’s just a distraction in the argument to me. Tort reform should focus on separating legitimate claims from outrageous claims early in the process, so defendents are less likely to settle just to make a claim go away.
You have a legitimate point in that we don’t often see the apportionment between economic and non-economic damages. (See Texas for a closed claim database on this.) But also don’t miss the indirect influences of unlimited non-economics; one large jury award increases the starting point demand and can also increase the frequency of future claims in the hopes of the “jackpot” payout. Limits can help squelch the frequency growth and quell severity inflation.
Medical review boards do seem to be a reasonable way to screen valid claims.
I’m standing here with my mouth open in shock. A Maryland Court with some sense?
My concern about review boards is that they are bureaucratic in nature and may potentially be political (like some of the Industrial Accident “judges” that I have seen). I would like to see plaintifs and their attorneys have some skin in the game, being forced to pay at least some of the defense costs if they lose.