Florida’s Ailing $6 Billion Rail Line Has Debt Vultures Circling

It’s becoming clearer by the day that Brightline, the struggling Florida private railroad, is shaping up to rank among the biggest municipal-bond restructurings ever, alongside the likes of Puerto Rico and Detroit.

But that’s where any clarity around the future of billionaire Wes Edens’ $6 billion passion project ends.

The Fortress Investment Group-backed railroad’s complex debt structure — a mix of municipal and corporate notes issued by four subsidiaries — is among the biggest challenges, as are the pack of firms jockeying for position in any workout scenario.

Invesco Ltd. and Nuveen LLC, giants in the world of tax-exempt securities, lead a group holding Brightline’s $2.2 billion of highest-priority debt that also includes First Eagle Investments. Bond insurer Assured Guaranty Ltd. looms large, too — it guarantees about $1.1 billion of senior securities, a majority, and must consent to any changes.

Meanwhile, distressed specialists Redwood Capital, Aristeia Capital and Nut Tree Capital Management lurk one rung below in the hierarchy. So does an entity of Israel-based Phoenix Financial Ltd., Bloomberg reported last week.

Both factions are angling for a way to wrest control of the railroad in exchange for a large investment, potentially in the form of senior loans to finance a bankruptcy, according to people familiar with the matter.

And then there are the wild cards: deep-pocketed infrastructure funds or strategic buyers that could also be in the mix to take over. One firm that had considered investing in Brightline, but has since moved on, was Italian infrastructure firm Mundys SpA, which owns airports and toll roads, some of the people said.

These competing interests are all coming to a head. Brightline’s auditors warned recently that it doesn’t have the cash to service its debt and meet financial obligations over the next 12 months, raising “substantial doubt” about the 235-mile line’s ability to function without some sort of relief.

For now, the trains between Miami and Orlando are running — still with far fewer riders than projected — and the rail operator has tapped consultants in a renewed bid to find third-party investors and avoid a possible bankruptcy. But its creditors broadly agree that the situation is untenable, and that a debt restructuring, whether in or out of court, is coming within months.

“The debt that the company took out to pay for the project was too high for a realistic assessment of how much ridership they were going to attract,” said Yonah Freemark, a researcher at the Urban Institute. “This is why, generally, infrastructure projects come with public subsidies.”

Interviews with restructuring experts and people with direct knowledge of the Brightline situation describe the railroad plowing slowly into a cash crunch as high costs continuously outstripped revenue.

But its various creditors are now in a race to the finish, huddling with the company in confidential talks as Fortress prepares to relinquish an albatross that lost it $2.2 billion in equity over the course of more than a decade. In the same time span, Fortress itself underwent three ownership changes and a management turnover, and pivoted from its early private equity model to private credit and real estate investments.

A potential bankruptcy, in particular, could cast a shadow over Brightline’s more ambitious project located some 2,500 miles away — a $21.5 billion high-speed rail line between Southern California and Las Vegas called Brightline West.

“Brightline continues to demonstrate strong momentum, with first quarter 2026 marking the highest ridership and revenue performance in our history, with 20% year-over-year growth in March,” a Brightline spokesperson said. “We are currently engaged with our partners on various options to enhance our balance sheet and position our company for long-term success.”

Representatives for Fortress, Invesco, Assured, Nuveen and First Eagle declined to comment. The funds involved in the corporate debt either declined to comment or didn’t respond to requests or comment.

Derailed Bet

Brightline, the first privately-funded railroad in more than a century, is the brainchild of Edens, the former co-chief executive officer of Fortress. The rail operator borrowed heavily in a bet that Americans were ready to embrace intercity train travel for trips that are “too long to drive, too short to fly.”

The railroad started service between Miami and West Palm Beach in 2018 and opened its extension to Orlando in 2023. Many riders gushed about its leather seats, free-WiFi and perfume-scented lounges. The service was popular with professionals in South Florida who could work on the train or go out for an evening in Miami.

But Brightline never came close to meeting projections. It carried about 3.1 million riders in 2025, about the same as Amtrak’s Acela, but less than half of what the firm estimated in a bond offering document just the year before. Revenue of $214 million was just one third of projections.

Brightline has barely been profitable as a result. It reported roughly $13 million in operating earnings last year, but when adding back the cost of depreciation and amortization — important factors for a rail service — it had a $127 million operating loss.

Its cash position is tight, with just $1.4 million considered unrestricted as of year-end. It’s that figure, above most others, that has bondholders bracing for a restructuring — even if it’s not yet clear which Brightline entities it would include or which creditors will control the process.

“Bondholders may take a haircut, but it could right-size the balance sheet,” said Joseph Schwieterman, a professor at DePaul University’s School for Public Service and an expert in public policy, transportation and urban planning. “That’s pretty good news from a transportation standpoint, not for bondholders.”

By law, a rail operator’s bankruptcy typically requires special procedures that prioritize continuity of service and involve the appointment of an independent trustee. It’s not yet clear how those requirements feature in the ongoing Brightline negotiations.

Expensive, Slow

Almost since it began, Brightline has struggled to make a compelling case to Florida residents.

Ticket prices, many potential customers say, are too expensive, especially when considering the lack of mass transit options from Brightline’s terminal at the Orlando airport to the likes of Walt Disney World and Universal Orlando. Plus, the three-and-a-half hour trip from Miami to Orlando isn’t much faster than driving up Florida’s Turnpike.

The railroad has also had more serious issues. A slew of train-related deaths and collisions damaged the company’s image and caused delays for travelers as police investigated accidents.

But above all, its longstanding struggle has been with its debt burden. Even what looks like solid double-digit growth in ridership and revenue to start the year isn’t sufficient to make bond payments coming due.

Brightline has used reserves to cover interest on its senior bonds and $1.1 billion of corporate notes, but that money will be exhausted by the start of 2027. The railroad has skipped or delayed payments on another $2 billion of junior-ranking municipal bonds, and has fully tapped a $45 million revolving credit facility, which matures at the end of May.

What’s Next

With its cash and liquidity options nearly depleted, all eyes are on what happens next among its creditors as they assess their protections relative to others.

Brightline’s senior municipal debt is secured by all revenue and assets of the railroad. Annual debt service on the bonds, with coupons ranging between 5% and 5.5%, is $117 million.

The $1.1 billion of senior bonds insured by Assured, which has a AA rating, trade close to par, reflecting that the company will cover any shortfall. The remaining uninsured senior bonds, rated CCC- by S&P Global Ratings, reflect market expectations of that gap: they trade as low as 57 cents.

The company’s corporate notes, which sit one rung below the senior operating company, reflect much deeper distress. Even with a hefty 11% coupon, they last traded at just 10 cents on the dollar.

The holders of each of these securities, people close to the situation say, could benefit from a maneuver that gives them the upper hand in any restructuring of Brightline. Even if it requires hundreds of millions of dollars upfront, the thinking goes, putting the railroad on a path to profitability — and therefore being able to make sizable interest payments for years to come — could be a winning trade in the end.

Elsewhere in the stack are two different classes of unrated muni bonds with tax-exempt coupons between 10% and 14%. Those bonds, which are also held by Nuveen and First Eagle, haven’t traded since January.

As for Assured, its CEO Dominic Frederico said on a May 8 earnings call that he doesn’t expect to take a loss on Brightline because the railroad is worth at least $2.2 billion, the amount of senior secured debt.

If Brightline defaults, Assured would have to make principal and interest payments when due, about $58 million annually. It also might end up being at least a part-owner.

“I don’t mind owning a railroad,” Frederico said.

Authored by Martin Z. Braun, Eliza Ronalds-Hannon, Soma Biswas and Reshmi Basu, Bloomberg News.

Photo: The smart cabin on a Brightline train in Aventura. (Bloomberg)