Supervisor’s Punching of Employees Enough for Tort Suit, NC Appeals Court Says

The North Carolina Court of Appeals last week reinforced long-debated exceptions to the exclusive remedy of the workers’ compensation system in two high-profile cases that could prove costly for employers and insurers.

In the first case, from Charlotte, the appeals court judges found that a worker injured by his boss’ repeated punches to his head and neck can sue for negligence, even if injury was not intended. In the second, from Rowan County, a worker sent by a staffing agency can file a tort suit against a concrete company if the labor agreement did not specify that the concrete firm was an employer.

“Because there was no record evidence of an implied contract of hire between Plaintiff and Defendant, neither the joint employment doctrine nor the lent employee doctrine applies,” Judge Allegra Collins wrote in Robert Jefferson vs. Johnson Concrete, posted Oct. 7.

Jefferson had signed up with Labor Finders, a temporary staffing firm, in 2022 and was sent to work for Johnson Concrete. While cleaning a concrete mixer, Jefferson’s arm was caught by a mixing blade, causing extensive injuries, the court explained. He filed suit, charging negligence by the concrete company and seeking punitive damages.

Johnson Concrete’s lawyers argued that, although Jefferson was ostensibly hired by Labor Finders, he also was considered an implied employee of the concrete company. That would make Jefferson covered only by the limited wage replacement and medical benefits provided by the workers’ compensation statute, the company said in court briefs.

The “borrowed servant” and joint-employment doctrines have been considered and reconsidered by courts across the country for decades. But North Carolina’s Court of Appeals, in an opinion in Solis-Santos vs. Lester in November 2025, helped nailed it down for the Tarheel State: For the end-use company to be considered an employer, subject only to the grand bargain of workers’ comp, some form of contract must show that.

“Contrary to the record evidence in Solis-Santos … the record evidence here shows that Plaintiff and Defendant did not have an implied contract of hire,” the court noted.

Crucially, a concrete company representative had testified in deposition that Jefferson was not considered an employee, was not paid wages directly by Johnson Concrete and was not covered by the firm’s workers’ comp policy.

The judges did not hold back on what they thought of Johnson’s argument.

“Defendant essentially wants the benefit of the exclusivity provision of the Worker’s Compensation Act without the burdens associated with being Plaintiff’s employer—Defendant cannot have it both ways,” the appellate court concluded.

Because the exclusivity provision of the North Carolina Workers’ Compensation Act did not divest the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claims, the trial court erred by granting defendant partial summary judgment in the case. “Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.”

Appeals Court Judge Jeff Griffin dissented.

In the other case, Randy Hembree had worked for the Hendrick Automotive Group in Charlotte for 10 years. He said his supervisor, Eric William Wright, would regularly strike employees about the head and neck, presumably as a form of motivation.

The punching continued even after Hembree had neck surgery in 2015, the court explained. By 2022, Hembree said the blows had led to real problems: He was experiencing vertigo, blurred vision, numbness and fatigue—symptoms that worsened to the point that Hembree eventually could no longer work.

He filed suit against the auto dealership and Wright, alleging willful negligence and intentional misconduct—actions that can allow exceptions to the exclusive workers’ comp remedy.

The defendant’s attorneys argued that Wright was covered by the workers’ compensation law because he had not intended to cause injury to Hembree or other punched employees.

But the appeals court judges found that previous court decisions and the comp statute make it clear that any intentional action, never mind the contemplation of harm, was enough to allow a lawsuit against the supervisor.

“Regardless of whether he intended the contact to cause the harm that allegedly resulted, it was his intent to make the unwanted contact that supplied the requisite intent permitting the invocation of the Pleasant exception,” Judge Julee Flood wrote, citing the comp exception laid down by the state Supreme Court in the Pleasant vs. Johnson decision in 1985.

“Plaintiff’s complaint alleged behavior by Defendant Wright that amounted to an intentional tort. Pursuant to Pleasant, the exclusivity provision of the Act does not apply to such a claim. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order denying Defendant Wright’s motion to dismiss.”

Topics Lawsuits North Carolina