Faulty Blowout Preventer Contributed to Deadly BP Spill

A faulty blowout preventer and weaknesses in how companies analyze potential hazards in offshore oil and gas operations contributed to BP’s deadly Gulf of Mexico oil spill more than four years ago, the U.S. Chemical Safety Board said.

Despite tougher regulations, a slew of investigations and an ongoing federal civil trial with potentially billions of dollars at stake, companies may still drill without demonstrating that they have adequate barriers in place to prevent deadly accidents, the agency said.

The CSB, which has no enforcement authority but can recommend safer practices, probes accidents at chemical plants and refineries. The BP investigation was its first involving an offshore accident. The CSB did not examine all aspects of the Macondo blowout and explosion that killed 11 men and spilled more than 4 million barrels of oil into the Gulf. Rather than re-examine issues already covered by other probes, the CSB studied equipment and hazardous materials operations and safety management.

BP spokesman Geoff Morrell said the core findings were consistent with other probes that said the disaster stemmed from multiple causes involving multiple parties.

The CSB concluded that the blowout preventer failed because the drillpipe inside of it was off-center and could not be fully sheared. The blowout preventer’s control systems also were miswired.

A blowout preventer is a multi-ton stack of valves and pipes that sits atop deepwater wells to stop oil and gas from gushing upward in an accident.

Also, the board said different pressures inside the drillpipe and the area between the pipe and the well caused it to move off center, so a shear ram could not cut through the pipe to seal the well.

In 2011, Cameron International Corp, the maker of the blowout preventer, agreed to a $250 million settlement with BP to help pay for costs associated with the spill.

Topics Energy Oil Gas